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PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: We are honored and delighted to have
Ambassador Clint Williams, the United States Ambassador-At-Large for
War Crimes, as our next speaker. He's had a very distinguished career.
He has served as the Director for Stability Operations for the National
Security Council, senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, and a
part of the United Nations mission in Kosovo. Of particularly great
relevance today to our topic is the fact that he has served as a prosecutor
on the ICTY. Please welcome Ambassador Clint Williams.
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: It's great to be here. It's nice to
see some old colleagues and an old boss Richard Goldstone. As Louis
said and some of you know from looking at the program, I spent quite a
while at the ICTY. I was there for seven years as a trial attorney from
1994 to 2001. But over the last four years, I've been working on broader
issues of stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping and post-conflict
response.
My focus during the time that I was at the National Security Council
was on how the U.S. government could develop its capabilities for
dealing with these situations. During that time I worked closely with the
UN and the EU, who were also struggling with how they as
organizations could do a better job of responding to these scenarios.
Likewise, I worked with a number of national governments who were
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also struggling with these issues, but particularly with the UK, France,
Germany and Canada, who have been leaders in this field.
Rule of Law Foundation
But no matter who you're talking to or perspective they're bringing
to the table, one thing in which everyone agrees who knows these issues
is that in any post-conflict stabilization reconstruction mission, if it is to
be successful, it must be built on a foundation of rule of law. So whether
we're talking about Kosovo or Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Afghanistan or
Iraq, if you do not establish a secure environment in which rule of law
prevails, everything else that you try to do in that mission is doomed to
failure.
This is particularly so when you're dealing with states that are
emerging from ethnic warfare or situations where they've had killing on
a mass scale, where large groups were targeted for deportation or other
forms of persecution. But if those states or regions are to move forward,
they must come to terms with their past and there must be some sense
among the people, particularly those who were victimized, that justice is
being done. But as you've already heard this morning, and as I'm sure
you know, this is a fairly recent phenomenon where this has come to be
universally or almost universally accepted.
Evolution of the ICTY, ICTR, & ICC
It was only in the 1990s that the UN started including rule of law
components in its peacekeeping missions. It was in the 1990s that we
saw the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals created, the first ones since the
end of World War II. But since then, it's been an exciting time in the
field of international humanitarian law. We have seen the creation of the
ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectfully. We've had the long
negotiations for the establishment of the ICC and its starting work. The
development of novel approaches in the form of hybrid tribunals like in
Sierra Leone and now in Cambodia, and the creation of special war
crimes chambers within domestic court systems, in Iraq, in Bosnia, in
Serbia, and with others contemplated in places like Burundi.
Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues Appointed by the United
States
This evolution has also manifested itself in the State Department, in
my office. In 1997 Secretary Albright created a position for an
Ambassador-at-Large in the department who would focus exclusively on
war crimes issues. The United States was the first government to appoint
a senior diplomat in such a role. It wasn't surprising coming as it did in
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the mid '90s after the Rwanda genocide and after the wars in former
Yugoslavia.
When the Bush Administration came to office in 2001, they retained
this position and I'm now the third person to serve as Ambassador. My
predecessors were David Sheffer and Pierre Prosper. But over time, the
focus of the office has shifted somewhat as well. For most of the 1990s,
the office was focused on the existing tribunals, on the ICTY and the
ICTR and then increasingly in the negotiations leading up to the ICC. It
had a small staff, five or six people, but even with this small number of
issues, they were really stretched in what they were able to do. But since
then, rather than see the workload diminish, it has steadily increased.
This is evidenced by the fact that we're now in the midst of a significant
enlargement of the office, from five people that were there when I started
in July to 14 by the end of the year, including a full-time field officer in
the Balkans.
This more robust staffing will allow us to move beyond the
traditional focus just on the tribunals and to devote more attention to
domestic efforts and to potential crisis zones, as well as the well-
established international courts. We will be able for the first time to
assign our officers to distinct manageable regional portfolios where we
will have sustained engagement in certain parts of the world, where we
can help with the courts that exist there and anticipate crises as they
develop.
Prevention and Response Initiative
We are also trying to better prepare ourselves as a government for
the whole range of war crimes challenges we're likely to face in the
future. Through a prevention and response initiative, we're setting up
mechanisms to help us identify the warning signs of an impending
genocide, a crisis involving large-scale crimes, and what preventative
steps we can take to head it off. I will tell why this is needed. If you go
back to Rwanda, you saw this with a radio broadcast coming out and
some of you had seen Hotel Rwanda or read the book or just are familiar
with what happened, you started having radio broadcasts saying kill the
cockroaches, this kind of thing, that a lot of people might not have
picked up on. If they were really paying attention, they knew what to
look for, they certainly would have focused on it.
We recently did an exercise with 25 CIA agents, and these were
new people coming into the CIA. It was just an exercise to see how they
would deal with scenarios in the field. They were given a whole list of
things that had happened. One of them is that people come into a
refugee camp and several hundred of them are massacred. Out of the 25
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junior officers that were going through this, only one of them would have
bothered to have reported it back to Washington as something requiring
attention.
So what we're trying to do is educate people. Our foreign service
officers, our CIA people, our U.S. aid officers who are out in the field to
look for what are the warning signs. When something like this is
developing, let us know back in Washington and then try to develop
measures that we can use to prevent it from developing into a full-blown
crisis. But we're not going to succeed all the time. If we don't succeed,
we need to be prepared to respond as the crisis unfolds or in its
immediate aftermath. We need to be able to deploy the resources
necessary to secure evidence, to locate witnesses, to take statements, to
exhume mass graves, to do these types of things.
We were faced with this in Bosnia. We were faced with it in
Darfur. We were faced with it in Iraq. Every time that we had to do this
we have to reinvent the wheel. So we need to be able to have these
resources available to deploy quickly. This capability should be
available primarily to support multilateral efforts, particularly through
the UN, through tribunals, but also with individual governments that
request our assistance. Finally, we want to enhance our capabilities to
assist with institution building and institutional support for international,
mixed and domestic war crimes courts.
U.S. Approach to International Criminal Courts
In terms of the various types of war crimes courts that exist today,
this might be a good point to actually shift and talk briefly about the U.S.
approach to these various models. Obviously, the International Criminal
Court is now established. It is a permanent fixture. It clearly has a place
in the sphere of international justice. As everyone knows, the U.S.
government has had serious misgivings about the ICC and has chosen
not to participate in the court. That said, the U.S. certainly recognizes
the right of other nations to join the court, and we respect their decisions
to do so. I think it is also possible and it's desirable to find common
ground with our European partners and with other countries around the
world on the ICC. As Javier Solano said, the U.S. and Europe need to
move past finger pointing regarding the ICC and find a modus vivendi on
the court.
The ICTY & ICTR
We're seeking to do that and I think certain steps that have been
taken by the U.S. over the past year have helped to improve the tone of
the dialogue. As to the ICTY and the ICTR, the other fully international
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courts, the U.S. has been and remains the single strongest supporter. The
U.S. was the driving force for the creation of both courts and at the outset
provided a large infusion of personnel, including myself, to help get the
courts up and running.
The U.S. has also been by far the largest financial donor to both
courts. Contributing around 500 million dollars over the lifetime of the
institutions. We continue to pay about 25 percent of the budget of both
courts. Around 35 million and 30 million dollars respectfully.
Sierra Leone
The U.S. has also been very supportive of the world's first hybrid
tribunal in Sierra Leone, an institution that David Crane helped so much
to shape. With the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the U.S. is currently
providing about one-third of the funding for its budget.
Iraq, Bosnia & Serbia
In terms of domestic war crimes chambers in Iraq, in Bosnia, in
Serbia, the U.S. provides extensive assistance in the form of financial
support, training and technical assistance. Particularly in the Balkans,
right now we are making a concerted push to enhance domestic
prosecution capabilities. The ICTY obviously was never going to be
able to prosecute all of those responsible for serious crimes. It was, in
fact, envisaged from the beginning that local courts would eventually
take on many cases once they had the capability to do so, and more
importantly had the political will to do so.
Now as the ICTY seeks to complete its work, it's crucial that there
be robust domestic capabilities in place. To assist in this effort, we have
as I mentioned a moment ago established a field officer in the region
who is moving around, going from Belgrade to Zagreb to Sarajevo to
Pristina to other capitals in the region identifying both operational and
political problems that hamper cross border cooperation.
Ban on Extraditions of Citizens Across Borders
I just came back from a conference in Montenegro last week where
we had all the state war crimes prosecutors, the judges, the police,
witness protection specialists for three days in Montenegro talking about
this. Talking about what are the obstacles to them prosecuting people.
The single biggest bar is a ban on extraditions. Most of the countries
there have in their constitutions a prohibition on extraditions of their
citizens across borders.
So what has happened, for example, in Bosnia where the bulk of the
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crimes were committed, many were committed by Serbs who have gone
back to Serbia and cannot be extradited. So you have a situation where
we're either faced with them being prosecuted in Serbia or not
prosecuted at all. These are the type of issues that we're dealing with.
So we're trying to seek cooperation among the prosecutors, among the
judges, among the police to get cases off the ground. At the same time
we're also pushing to get this bar on extraditions lifted.
Often the issues that we're talking about can be resolved in the field
by a liaison officer, but where that's not the case, where it requires some
type of political intervention, then either our ambassador in the given
country or myself, can intervene and try to address it at senior political
levels.
This initiative has been warmly welcomed in the region. It shows
the type of practical things that we as a government can do to get things
moving and to help. The countries that are involved in this are all now
independent. All of them were at one time part of one country, part of
Yugoslavia, but they still have great difficulty communicating with each
other. The ICTY has difficulty stepping in and playing this role, but it's
something that we as a government can do as sort of an honest broker to
try to help the process along.
Diplomatic Efforts
Beyond this material support, the U.S. also continues to place a
heavy emphasis of diplomatic efforts related to war crimes issues. This
is evidenced by the fact that an ambassador, my job, with a rank of an
Assistant Secretary of State exists for this purpose. And we remain very
proactive in our approach to see that war criminals are brought to justice
and that we have a coordinated approach on these issues with our Allies.
I just returned over the weekend from my third trip to the Balkans in
three months, pressuring the Serbian leadership to resolve the cases with
the six remaining ICTY fugitives, but particularly those of Radovan
Karad id and Ratko Mladi6. Over the same three months, the Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Nick Burns, the Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs Dan Fried, and our ambassadors in the region have
delivered a similarly strong message in separate visits to Belgrade. The
Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor have delivered the
same message to Serbian leaders as they visited Washington.
Also on my last trip, my final stops were in Brussels and in the
Hague to coordinate first of all with our EU counterparts in Brussels and
then with the ICTY Prosecutor. Over the next two months, I'll be
making two trips to Africa with a heavy emphasis on the ICTR fugitive
cases. All in all my predecessor traveled 290 days in his last year in
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office. I'm hoping not to be on the road quite that much, but it's already
shaping to about at least half of my time traveling and most of this is
overseas on diplomatic efforts related to war crimes, as will all of the
staff in my office.
No other country in the world engages in that sort of sustained
systematic diplomacy on these issues, but it's critical that we continue to
do so. The various courts have relatively little political weight that they
can bring to bear on their own accord. Therefore, they are very reliant on
national governments to do much of the political heavy lifting and to
apply the pressure that is necessary to ensure that states comply with
their obligations to cooperate with the courts.
Serbia is a prime example of this right now. If it is just the ICTY
talking with the Serbian Prime Minister and the Serbian President, very
little is going to happen. What is bringing pressure on the Serbian
leadership is the fact they want to get into the EU, they want to get into
NATO, and this is what is holding them up. They have to resolve these
issues before they can move forward on the EU or NATO accession.
Future Role of the United States
I think it's fair to say that these issues will remain high on the U.S.
policy agenda. As I mentioned at the outset, there is a much better
understanding now that holding persons accountable for large-scale
crimes does have an important role in stabilizing countries or regions
emerging from war. So there is a national security interest in doing this,
in doing what we can to strengthen fragile states. I think everyone in the
government and in the country should recognize that there is a serious
threat posed by fragile states.
The single largest attack ever launched on the United States, the
attacks of 9/11, originated not in one of our traditional adversaries, a
state with strong armies, but it came from what was undoubtedly a failed
state. The second poorest state on the face of the earth, in Afghanistan.
So we have a national security interest in addressing instability wherever
it exists in the world. Beyond this though, there is also a compelling
moral obligation to engage in these issues and to support efforts in
achieving international justice.
The United States has traditionally played a leading role in this
field. From one of the first attempts to codify conduct in warfare by
Francis Lieber during the American Civil War to the creation of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions, and most recently with the establishment of the ICTY and
the ICTR, the U.S. has been at the forefront of these efforts.
Admittedly over the last few years as our country has grappled with
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how to deal with the threat posed by terrorism, our representation and
our credibility in these areas have suffered. The U.S. approach to the
ICC, the detentions at Guantanamo, the abuses at Abu Ghraib have led
many around the world to question our intentions and our commitment.
People do have legitimate concerns about these issues, both outside and
inside the government. And they are obviously the subject of an ongoing
active debate. It's unlikely that all of these issues are going to be
resolved in the near future. The debate will continue, but I do not think
that this means that the United States should withdraw from the field of
international justice in the meantime.
On the contrary, we have a valuable part to play and it is critically
important that we reconnect with our traditional role as a leader in this
field. It is important to the ICTY, it is important to the ICTR, to the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and to the many domestic courts that rely
on us that we keep doing what we are doing. And it is important for the
global community and for us as a nation that we bridge the divides that
have grown up between us and our partners around the world. Thank
you.
(Applause.)
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Thank you, Clint, for that very positive
statement and we now will engage in about 15 minutes of commentary
and questions. Does anybody on the panel want to initiate? Yes, go
ahead.
PROFESSOR GROOME: I applaud your statement. It is important
for us to reconnect. I know for many of us Americans in this field it is
kind of discouraging to not feel that our country is the leader in this area.
I am just wondering what types of practical steps do you see as ways to
reconnect?
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: Well, I think there's a couple of
things. Number one, the ICC has been an issue which has been
particularly divisive between the United States and our traditional
partners on these issues. Over the last year, you have seen the U.S.
position on the ICC soften somewhat. First of all the United States
agreed to the referral of the Sudan case to the ICC. The United States
played an important role in having the Charles Taylor trial take place on
the ICC premises. No objection was raised there. You have seen the
United States sort of move away from its emphasis on these Article 98
agreements that have been signed. And you had statements both from
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State saying that we need
to reconsider this and the effect that it has on our foreign policy.
So I think this has helped a lot with the dialogue. I would like to
think that my appointment has helped. I certainly have a background in
these issues. There were other people that were considered for this job
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that I think had a more ideological approach to it. But I think that we
have tried to reach out and have a meaningful dialogue with other
governments. Certainly in my talks with people in the EU, with other
governments they want to have a dialogue, and I think that the ICC is
very interested in a dialogue.
But you have to recognize too that a lot of the opposition on the ICC
comes in Congress and, in fact, because of the American Servicemen's
Protection Act, there are certain prohibitions on what we can and we
cannot do. So there are limitations on how far we can go at the moment,
but I think this is something where we need to have a dialogue. As
Javier Solano said, it's in both of our interests to find common ground on
these issues. It doesn't do any good to say well, you did this or you
didn't do that or this is going to do this or this is going to cause this to
happen. Let's see where we have common interest here. Sudan is one of
the cases where we did, I mean where we agreed that this would be the
appropriate forum for that case to be heard. So I think this is one thing.
Another thing is the work that we continue to do with the tribunals.
For example, no other country in the world comes close to the amount of
money that we are putting into these courts. No other country has the
same record of intelligence sharing that we do with these various courts.
No other country as I said engages in diplomatic efforts on behalf of
these courts in the same way that we do.
I just left the Hague, spent a full day with the ICTY Prosecutor who
was saying very few diplomats come calling anymore and saying what
can we do to help. We are making a concerted effort to do that. So
again, a lot of it is are these practical steps, but I think more of it is just in
the tone of the dialogue that is coming out and how we are discussing
these issues and again just expressing an interest to find common ground.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Richard.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: If I could follow up just briefly because
before you came this morning I spoke in more detail than you did about
the crucial assistance that the United States gave for the ICTY and ICTR
and, in fact, I put it very strongly that without that there would not have
been either established and they would not have got off their feet. This is
obviously relevant to the absence of that assistance for the ICC.
In a situation like Darfur where as stated and I think it is fairly clear
the United States interest is in favor of a successful investigation and
prosecution. My understanding is that notwithstanding the Prohibition
Act, the president can authorize assistance or exemption. Is there any
prospect of assistance, active assistance? When I talk about active
assistance, I am talking about more what happens behind closed doors
than what happens in public and pressurizing Sudan and its neighbors
into the conflicts there, but I think the United States can be most helpful.
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I mean the ICC is not short of financial sources.
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: It's a good question. What you
point out is correct. In the American Servicemen's Protection Act, the
ASPA, the final provision says that nothing in this act shall constrain the
United States government from seeing that people responsible for crimes
against humanity are brought to justice. For example, I think it names
Osama bin Laden, Slobodan Milogevi6, Saddam Hussein. I don't know
who else it names as examples.
So there is a clause there that allows cooperation. We have said that
we would be open to finding ways to work with the court on this. I was
asked this question specifically during my confirmation hearing in the
Senate and said if the United States were to receive a request for
assistance from the court, would we be prepared to honor it, and we have
said yes, we would. But I think this is something that the ICC wants to
be very careful about doing. They certainly do not want to ask us for
something and have us say no. But I think we would be open to it and I
think there are ways that this can be worked out.
A lot of the people who were opposed to the ICC are also people
who have been very strong on calling for justice in Sudan. People who
might have an ideological opposition to the court would be willing to see
this as a place where maybe the ICC is the appropriate forum.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Yes.
STUDENT: I would like to ask, have you ever received any
pressure so as to discourage you from prosecuting certain individuals or
not to do some investigation because as far as I see, beyond the personal
network of people that every criminal have, there are also people maybe
living on the opposite side of the world who have interest in for instance
civil wars or selling weapons and so on? So maybe I guess that in a
certain way they can also reach prosecutor.
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: In my current role, I'm a
diplomat. I am not dealing with the actual prosecution of cases. This is
taking place in the tribunals and we certainly try to support them. At
times we get requests asking us to intervene with the tribunals a lot of
times from interest groups and saying oh, the tribunal, ICTY is doing this
or the ICTR hasn't done this, you know, can you force them to do it.
Our response is always these are independent courts. We are going to
support their efforts, but we are not going to get involved in individual
cases and say you have to do this or you have to do that. I think that
most governments try to observe that rule. I don not think that there is
that kind of blatant pressure that goes on.
We talked about this a little bit earlier this morning as Richard
mentioned about a situation when the Karadi6 and Mladi6 indictments
occurred. I was at the ICTY when we were doing the Milogevi6
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indictment in 1999 during the Kosovo war and was one of two lead
attorneys on that case. And certainly, if anything, the pressure was not to
indict Milogevi6, not the other way around. When the indictment came
out, there was a lot of speculation in the press that this was being done at
the request of the U.S. government or the British government or NATO
as one of their tools in the war against Serbia. In fact, as we said, those
governments I think would have much preferred that there not be an
indictment because they saw this as interfering with the negotiation
process.
I have never seen situations in my time working in the tribunals,
working in the UN or in my current role where governments come in and
just blatantly try to influence the process. I think it is a lot more subtle
than that. You know, they may make known they would prefer
something or another, but the last thing they want to do is be seen as
having too heavy a hand in the process and then have this all over the
press and being shown as trying to manipulate something which should
be an independent judicial process.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Yes.
STUDENT: I would like to know of what economic importance is
the role of United States in Baghdad in the case of Saddam Hussein?
What is the United States to gain?
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: I'm sorry, I don't understand.
STUDENT: Of what economic importance is the role of United
States to the case of prosecuting Saddam Hussein?
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: Okay. The United States has
provided a lot of support to the Iraq court, a substantial amount. I don't
know exactly what it was last year. I think it was somewhere around 50
to 60 million in its first year to get the tribunal up and running. It is a
mixture of U.S., support from a few other countries, and support from the
Iraqi budget, I do not know exactly what the breakdown is.
STUDENT: So my question is what do they stand to gain? The
United States spend much more money than any other country. What do
they stand to gain in the long run?
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: Well, I don't think that any of
these things should be judged in the context of economic gain. I mean
what do we gain economically from supporting the court in Sierra
Leone? Very little. I think the policy gains of seeing Iraq stabilized are
much more important to the United States than the Balkans or Sierra
Leone or Cambodia where we have troops or we have a small number of
troops.
I mean where you have this huge U.S. commitment in Iraq, there is
a lot to be gained by seeing something that will help stabilize the
situation. Now, whether the Saddam trial will do that or not is
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questionable, but certainly there needs to be a coming to terms with the
past. And I think it goes back to what I was saying is that there's a moral
interest in seeing justice be done, in seeing cases brought to trial. There
is a national security interest, but I do not think that it's necessarily an
economic interest. I do not think that's what drives this process.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Yes.
STUDENT: I was going to ask Ambassador Williamson how much
does your office work with our current armed forces in terms of making
sure they are following and being observant with the Rules of War and
the Geneva Conventions? How much does your office work with the
uniformed JAG officers in each of the branches?
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: We do not have any role at all
in U.S. compliance with the Rules of War. I mean this is something
that's internal with the Department of Defense. If you have a situation
where an American soldier has committed a crime then leaves service, it
is an issue for the Department of Justice. Those are considered domestic
law enforcement matters. So we do not really have any role there.
We work with the JAGs a lot. We have right now two JAGs that
are assigned to my office that are detailed from the Department of
Defense that are working on these issues. So I mean we work with the
Department of Defense a lot on sort of general policy on this with JAGs
primarily. They help in training people in other countries. We try to use
them as a valuable resource, but again it's more of a collaborative effort.
It's not something in terms of enforcement of laws of war.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: My observation is as a non-American, I
was very pleasantly surprised at what I found on two unusual visits. I
was asked to come and talk about the ICC first at the National Defense
University in Washington, which is I think a premier war college for
more senior officers in the United States Armed Forces. And more
recently at the U.S. Air Academy in Colorado Springs. The first time I
went, I assumed I was going to go into a fairly conservative doctrinaire
atmosphere, and I couldn't have been more wrong in that. My
experiences on both occasions were the same as going on to any good
university campus-freedom on the part of students and faculty to
support the ICC, to oppose the ICC. There was a very good, very good
debate. Now, I say that was a very heartening experience for me and I'm
not sure that many people appreciate how the way it should be taught and
how well it is being taught.
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: And I think as you've seen with
Guantanamo, you've had JAG officers who have been defense counsel
for many of the detainees there, and some of them have been the most
outspoken critics of the detention policies at Guantanamo. Within this
room, there is an incredible diversity of opinions on issues of the day.
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The same diversity exists in the United States government. Ninety-
five percent of the people in the U.S. government or probably more than
that are civil servants. These are career people that are there from one
administration to the other. Even among political appointees there is not
a sort of a monolithic point of view that everybody sticks to one policy.
The debates that go on within the U.S. government I think are very
lively. Sometimes views prevail that I would not prefer. Sometimes you
know, things that I do want to see do get through.
I will give an example of the diversity of opinion in my time at the
NSC. I was originally brought to the NSC by a man named Rand Beers
who subsequently resigned over the Iraq War and became John Kerry's
principal foreign policy advisor. He was working in the Bush
Administration at the time I was brought there. My second boss was
Frank Miller who was the Special Assistant to the President for Defense
Policy. He is featured very prominently in Bob Woodward's latest book,
The State of Denial for the role that he played in the opposition to other
figures within the government. So again, this idea that the U.S.
government exists as one solid point of view is not accurate. What you
deal with on a daily basis and you don't encounter that in law school.
You don't encounter it even within your families. So to think that the
U.S. government, as big and unwieldy as it is, that there's one point of
view that always prevails and always shoves through policy just isn't
accurate.
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